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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WINDSOR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WINDSOR TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4684 
WILLIAM FINGER, for Charging Party 
On May 5, 1980, the Windsor Teachers Association (Associ-
ation) filed a charge which alleges the following facts. 
The Windsor Central School District (District) and the 
Association are parties to a collectively negotiated contract 
which specifies the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees from December 7, 1978 through June 30, 1981. That 
contract contains a grievance procedure which culminates in arbi-
tration. Three days prior to a scheduled arbitration, represen-
tatives of the District and the Association entered into an 
agreement resolving the grievance. Thereafter, the District 
failed to implement the agreement settling the grievance. 
The charge herein is that, by its failure to implement the 
agreement settling the grievance, the District violated §209-a.l 
(a),, (b) , (c) and (d) of the Taylor Law. 
Without requiring an answer from the District, the Acting 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation issued 
a decision dismissing the charge because the facts, as alleged, 
do not indicate a violation of any of the paragraphs of §209-a.l 
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of the Taylor Law. He determined that the basis of the charge 
was merely that the District had violated its agreement with the 
Association and, citing CSL §205.5(d), he ruled that this Board 
may not exercise jurisdiction over alleged contract violations 
that would not otherwise constitute an improper practice. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions which the 
Association filed to -this decision of -the Acting Director. In 
support of those exceptions, it contends that there is a dis-
tinction between the enforcement of an agreement, a matter which 
it concedes to be beyond this Board's jurisdiction, and the impla-
mentation of an agreement, a matter that it asserts is within our 
jurisdiction. The Association argues in its exceptions: "You 
simply cannot interpret or enforce that which has not been imple-
mented. " 
We affirm the decision of the Acting Director. The dis-
tinction that the Association makes between the enforcement and 
the implementation of an agreement is not persuasive. The parties 
herein negotiated an agreement in settlement of a grievance. The 
Association alleges that the District has refused to implement 
the agreement and, in its charge, it has asked this Board to order 
the District to do so. In other words, it is asking this Board 
to enforce the agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
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it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 15, 1980 
/ 
'//^-L-, X^/A JVL SJ>~J^<. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
fcp^-7 ^ . 7 ^ 
idles ,/Me David C. Randi ,/M mber 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HALF HOLLOW HILLS COMMUNITY LIBRARY 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
HALF HOLLOW HILLS LIBRARY EMPLOYEES .. 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
HALF HOLLOW HILLS COMMUNITY PUBLIC 
LIBRARY UNIT, SUFFOLK COUNTY CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC. , 
Intervenor. 
LEONARD T. SHORE, ESQ., for Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MARJORIE E. 
KAROWE, ESQ., of Counsel) for Intervenor 
The petition herein was filed by the Half Hollow Hills 
Library Employees Association (Association). It seeks certifica-
tion as a representative of a unit of full-time and part-time 
library employees of the Half Hollow Hills Community Library 
District (Employer). That unit is presently represented by the 
Half Hollow Hills Community Public Library Unit, Suffolk County 
Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). CSEA 
intervened in the proceeding and moved to dismiss the petition on 
the grounds that it was not timely because it was barred by a 
contract and that the Association is not an employee organization 
BOARD DECISION AND 
' ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2037 
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within the meaning of the Taylor Law. 
A hearing was held on the question whether the Associ-
ation is an employee organization, but not on the question 
whether the petition was barred by a contract. The hearing offi-• 
cer found that there was no issue of fact regarding this question 
as it was acknowledged that there was no written agreement betweer 
the Employer and CSEA. During the course of that hearing, CSEA 
attempted to introduce evidence that there was an oral contract 
which had been implemented. Such a contract, according to CSEA, 
would bar the petition. The hearing officer excluded this evi-
dence and her ruling was affirmed by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The matter 
now comes to us on the exceptions of CSEA to a decision of the 
Director that the.petition was timely and that the Association is 
a qualified employee organization. 
CSEA's first argument in support of its exceptions is 
that the hearing officer erred in excluding evidence that might 
have established that the petition was barred by a contract be-
tween it and the Employer. Given the agreement that there was no 
written contract, we find no error in the exclusion of this evi-
dence because proof of an oral contract between CSEA and the 
EmD'loyer would not bar the petition herein even if that contract 
has been implemented. In Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 
NLRB 1160 (1958), 42 LRRM 1506, the National Labor Relations 
1_ The law defines the term, employee organization, to mean "an 
organization of any kind having as its primary purpose the 
improvement of terms and conditions of employment of public 
employees . . „ . " 
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Board adopted the rule that 
"a contract to constitute a bar must be signed 
by all the parties before a petition is filed 
and that unless a contract signed by all the 
parties precedes a petition, it will not bar a 
petition even though the parties consider it 
properly concluded and put into effect some or 
all of its provisions." 
Its reason for adopting this rule was that to conduct an investi-
gation as to - whether or not there is. an oral contract would 
"render unduly complex a field that should not [be] so involved." 
In Farming dale UFSD, 7 PERB 1f3073 (1974) , we adopted the holding 
of the NLRB in Appalachian Shale. In.doing so, we affirmed the 
reasoning of the Director that "there should not be a need to 
resort to extraneous facts to determine whether a particular 
2 
document is a finalized contract that can serve as a bar." 
CSEA argues further that the Association should not be 
permitted to rely upon the absence of a written contract because 
the failure to reach a contract was brought about by the subver-
sive action of Paul Elsener. Elsener, now the president of the 
Association, had been the president of the CSEA unit and, in that 
capacity, was responsible for the negotiations. CSEA argues that, 
but for the negotiating tactics of Elsener, CSEA and the Employer 
would have executed a contract before the petition was filed. 
This argument of CSEA relates to alleged disloyalty of 
a CSEA officer. In CSEA and Bogack, 9 PERB 13064 (1976), CSEA 
was charged with disciplining another officer of its Suffolk 
2 Farmingdale UFSD, 7 PERB 14041 (1974). 
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Chapter because of disloyalty. In that case, CSEA argued success-
fully that this Board is not a proper forum to regulate the in-
ternal affairs of an employee organization. We held that prob-
lems of member disloyalty may be dealt with by a union so. long as 
the union does not deprive the member of his right to be repre-
sented in negotiations and contract administration. Here, it is 
CSEA, rather than a member, that is asking .this Board to look in-
to its internal conduct, but the answer must be the same. This 
Board is not a proper forum to deal with the complaint. 
The allegation of Elsener's disloyal activities is also 
raised by CSEA in support of the proposition that the Association 
is not an employee organization. This issue was dealt with by us 
directly in Buffalo Sewer Authority, 13 PERB 1[3052 (1980). In 
that case, as in the present, the leader of the petitioner had 
been an officer of the incumbent employee organization. The 
incumbent complained that its former officer had violated his 
fiduciary obligation to it in order to enhance the status of the 
petitioner. It argued that by reason of this conduct, the peti-
tioner should have been disqualified for certification. Relying, 
in part, upon our decision in CSEA and Bogack, supra, we rejected 
this argument. We do so again. 
Notwithstanding-evidence that the Association's pur-
poses are to improve employee working conditions and better their 
salaries, CSEA asserts that the Association is not an employee 
organization. It bases this assertion upon a suggestion that all 
members of the Association may not be permitted to vote. The fac-
tual basis for the suggestion, however, is too frail to support it 
• 6641 
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A member of the Association was, asked by CSEA whether there was 
any restriction upon membership or voting rights. She said that 
she did not know of any, but acknowledged that she was late for 
one meeting. This testimony is not sufficient to raise a serious 
doubt about the matter. Moreover, there is other record evidence 
showing votes taken at meetings without any indication of re-
strictions-. 
In part, the other record evidence derives from Associ-
ation Exhibit 1. It is,the minutes of the Association meeting 
held on January 16, 1980, and was prepared by Elsener. CSEA 
argues that the exhibit should have been excluded because Elsener 
typed the minutes from longhand notes of the Association's secre-
tary which were destroyed. But Elsener was present at the meet-
ing of January 16, 1980, and he testified that the minutes were an 
accurate record of what occurred. Moreover, the minutes were 
approved by the members at a subsequent meeting. Accordingly, we 
affirm the ruling of the hearing officer, adopted by the Director 
admitting the minutes. 
WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director that the Associ-
ation is an employee organization within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law and that its petition was timely filed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret 
ballot be held under the supervision of 
the Director among the employees of the 
Employer in the stipulated unit who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately 
preceding the date of this decision. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall submit to 
' 6642 
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the Director, as well as to Half Hollow 
Hills Library Employees Association and 
the Half Hollow Hills Community Public 
Library Unit, Suffolk County Chapter, 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
within seven days from the receipt of 
this decision, an alphabetized list of 
all employees- in the stipulated unit who 
were employed on the payroll date immedi-
ately preceding the date of this decision 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 16, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C Randies, • Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FAIRVIEW FIRE DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
FAIRVIEW PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
BOARD.DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4682 
RAINS & POGREBIN, for Charging Party 
THOMAS FLYNN, fdr. Respondent- :. 
The charge herein was filed by the Fairview Fire District 
(District). It alleges that the Fairview Professional Fire-
fighters Association, Inc. (Association) violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith in that the president of the Association, 
who was not a panel member, communicated privately with the impar 
tial chairman of an interest arbitration panel appointed pursuant 
to §209.4 of the Taylor Law and attempted to influence him regard-
ing an award that he was preparing. The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed the 
charge on the ground that it did not set forth a Taylor Law cause 
of action. He ruled that proceedings before an interest arbitra-
tion panel are not part of the negotiation process and, therefore 
a party's conduct during interest arbitration proceedings could 
not constitute a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of the District. 
It argues that the duty to negotiate in good faith requires a 
party to conform to acceptable norms of behavior while partici-
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pating in all the negotiation and conciliation procedures Pre-
scribed by §209 of the Taylor Law, entitled "Resolution of Dis-
putes in the Course of Collective Negotiations." 
We affirm the decision of the Director. 
The Taylor Law recognizes a distinction between'interest 
arbitration and other "prescribed procedures designed to resolve 
disputes in the course _._of collective., negqt.iati.ons . ..For example, 
§209.4(c)(iv), dealine with interest arbitration, indicates a 
distinction between interest arbitration and other dispute reso-
lution procedures. It provides, "The Panel, prior to a vote on 
any issue in dispute before it, shall, upon the joint request of 
its two members representing the public employer and the employee 
organization respectively, refer the issues back to the parties 
for further negotiations;" (emphasis supplied). In other words, 
issues that are still susceptible of resolution through some 
means by the parties themselves are not properly within the ambit 
of the arbitration Process. 
Section 210.3(f), dealing with the criteria for fixing.the 
duration'of the forfeiture of dues deduction privileges of unions 
that strike, also indicates a distinction between interest arbi-
tration and other dispute resolution procedures. One of the fac-
tors to be considered in assessing the duration of the forfeiture 
is "the refusal of the employee organization or the appropriate 
public employer or the representative thereof, to submit to the 
mediation and fact-finding procedures provided in section two 
lundred nine...". 
The distinction between mediation and factfinding on the 
one hand and interest arbitration on the other is logical. By 
Board - U-4682 -3 
refusing to participate in mediation or factfinding, a party can 
thwart third party efforts to facilitate agreement by the parties 
themselves through collective bargaining. The party that refuses 
to participate in interest arbitration, however, thwarts nothing. 
It exercises no control over the outcome of the arbitration pro-
cess because the process may proceed without it and it may be 
bound by the_award,. City of Albany v. PERB, 86 Misc.2d 476, 
9 PERB 1[7009 (1976). 
Improper conduct during resolution of disputes by pro-
cedures designed to foster collective bargaining by the parties 
is., in the first instance, subject to the scrutiny of this Board 
1 
under provisions of law that mandate good faith negotiations. 
The interest arbitration process, however, is "subject to review 
by a court of competent jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by 
law." CSL §209.4(c)(vii). The conduct of the employee organi-
zation complained of herein may, of course, not give rise to a 
cause of action for the review of the determination of an inter-
est arbitration panel because there is no allegation here of any 
impropriety on the part of the interest arbitration panel. 
Rather, the allegation is that the employee organization, through 
its president, acted improperly. The absence of a remedy under 
§209.4(c)(vii) would not, however, bring the conduct within the 
improper practice jurisdiction of this Board. The conduct com-
plained about must be redressed, if at all, in some other forum 
1 Uniformed Fire Fighters Association, Mount Vernon, New York 
Local 107, IAFF, 11 PERB 1J3095 (1978); Schenectady Community 
College Faculty Association, 6 PERB 1[3027 (1973). 
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under general laws of the State, to the extent that they are 
relevant. 
In support of its exceptions, the District argues that 
this Board has asserted improper practice jurisdiction over con-
duct involved in the interest arbitration process in that it has 
ruled improper the submission of nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to interest arbitration. To be sure, under §205.6 of 
bur Rules, "we do "'permit the filing of improper practice charges 
alleging that matters have been improperly submitted to interest 
arbitration for diverse reasons. Such charges, however, may not 
involve conduct during the course of interest arbitration pro-
ceedings. Our jurisdiction over charges alleging a refusal to 
negotiate ceases after a negotiation deadlock is properly before 
an interest arbitration panel. It extends only to the commence-
ment of interest arbitration so that it may preclude use of that 
process when it is not properly available. In Town of Haverstraw, 
9 PERB 1(3063 (1976), for example, we held that an employee 
organization had improperly invoked the interest arbitration 
process in that it had not exhausted the negotiation process that 
must precede such arbitration. In that decision we wrote: 
"Interest arbitration is not, and was not, intended 
as an alternative to, or substitute for, good faith 
negotiations. Rather, it is a procedure of last re-
sort in police and fire department impasse situations 
when efforts of the parties themselves to reach 
agreement through true negotiations and conciliation 
procedures have actually been exhausted." 
The improper practice provisions of the Taylor Law effec-
tuate the collective negotiation policies of the law. They apply 
to all phases of the negotiation process and to procedures 
designed to effectuate that process. They extend to the threshold 
of the interest arbitration process, but not beyond. 
Board - U-4682 -f 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 15, 1980 
/ f , .(%&*-4>-7<L*-t 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Mem#e er 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Employer, 
-and-
ERIE COUNTY RANK & FILE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL NO. 815, ERIE COUNTY CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondent, 
-and -
ERIE COUNTY RANK AND FILE ASSOCIATION 
Charging Party, 
-and-
LOCAL NO. 815, ERIE COUNTY CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2074 
CASE NO. U-4650 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ., for Employer/ 
Respondent 
..•SARGENT:.;& REPKA, P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT,: 
ESQ. , of Counsel) for Petitioner/Charging 
Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (STEPHEN J. WILEY, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Intervenor 
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On May 29, 1980, the Erie County Rank and File Association 
(Association) filed a petition to represent a unit of approxi-
mately 4,000 white collar employees of the County of Erie 
(County) currently represented by Local 815, Erie County Civil 
Service Employees Association (CSEA).— The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation determined that the 
showing of interest was insufficient. However, he did not dismiss 
the petition because of facts elicited in an improper practice 
case involving the same parties. 
The improper practice case was brought by a charge of the 
Association alleging that the County had denied it appropriate 
access to unit employees during the period proximate to the 
time when a petition and showing of interest could have 
been filed. The hearing officer determined that during the 
course of a meeting held March 18, 1980, the County improperly 
denied four requests of the Association relating to access to 
2 
unit employees.—' In each instance the request was that an 
opportunity or privilege be made available to it that was 
3 
already available to CSEA.— The general approach of the County 
was that opportunities or privileges which were afforded to CSEA 
1. Although the parties all agreed upon the definition of the 
negotiating unit, there was some disagreement concerning'the 
application of the definition to some newly created jobs, 
2 The Association alleged other instances of improper denial 
of access but these were rejected by the hearing officer. The 
Association has filed no exceptions. 
3 In several instances the requests were presented in vague 
terms and without reference to the privileges enjoyed by CSEA. 
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pursuant to the collective agreement between CSEA and the County 
would not be extended to the Association. 
One of CSEA's rights under the contract was to receive a 
list of the names and home addresses of all unit employees. The 
contract provided that the list would be updated quarterly but, in 
fact, an updated list was furnished every two months. Although no 
restrictions were placed on CSEA's use of the list for campaign 
purposes, there is no evidence that CSEA used the list for any 
such purpose. There is evidence that the Association faced 
difficulties in reaching unit employees by telephone or mail 
because it was difficult to obtain addresses and phone numbers— 
but there is no evidence that it told this to the County, 
CSEA also enjoyed a contractual right to meeting room space 
on County property. While the contractual right was for executive 
committee meetings, the evidence discloses that other meetings 
were held on County property.. The evidence does not disclose 
the purposes of any particular meeting but it shows that the 
County imposed no restrictions upon CSEA. 
The third contractual right enjoyed by CSEA was for release 
time for designated representatives to engage in "union business." 
Among other things, CSEA representatives had the right to use the 
release time opportunities to explain CSEA membership benefits to 
unit employees. 
Although not authorized by the contract, CSEA had long 
distributed its newsletter. The Civil Tongue, on County property 
and some County officers were aware of this. The newsletter 
•4 A high percentage of the unit employees were women whose 
addresses and phone numbers were listed in the telephone book 
under a first name other than their own. 
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contained campaign materials. The Association, after being denied-
permission to distribute its campaign materials on County property, 
nevertheless, did so. This distribution was surreptitious and 
much more limited than CSEA' s distribution of The 'Civil' Tongue. 
On these facts the hearing officer determined that the 
Association was not given appropriate access to employees. He 
ruled that during the period proximate to the time when a petition 
may be filed, a challenging employee organization is entitled to 
reasonable access to employees on the premises of the employer. 
He further ruled that if the incumbent employee organization 
enjoys access rights that by an objective standard are more than 
would be reasonably required, it would, nevertheless, be 
unreasonable to deny the challenging organization equal access. 
Applying this test the hearing officer ruled that the County 
denied the Association reasonable access to employees when it 
denied the Association a list of the names and- addresses of the 
unit employees, space to meet, release time for organizational 
purposes and the right to distribute campaign literature, all of 
which were enjoyed by CSEA. As a remedy for this violation, he 
determined that the Association should be given a 45-day 
extension of time during which to file a showing of interest and 
he directed the County to grant the Association access to County 
facilities, property and information to the same extent and under 
the same conditions granted to CSEA during that 45-day period. 
The Director issued his. decision in the representation case 
the same day as the, hearing officer issued his decision in the 
improper practice case.' He adopted the findings of fact of the 
hearing officer but not his conclusion of law. Like the hearing 
XAXJ& 
;? 
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officer, he ruled that the Association was entitled to reasonable 
access to the premises and information of the County but he 
declined to rule that the access that it was entitled to must 
be, at least, equal to the access enjoyed by 'CSEA./ ...Instead,' '• 
he concluded that the extension of an opportunity or privilege to 
CSEA created a rebuttable presumption that it would be unreason-
able" to- deny the same opportunity or privilege to the Association. 
Applying this test, he determined that the County did not rebut 
the presumption that the inequality of treatment between the 
two organizations was unreasonable. Accordingly, he, too, ruled 
that the Association's time to file a showing of interest should 
be extended 45 days. 
These cases now come to us on the exceptions, of CSEA to the 
decisions of both the hearing officer and the Director. The 
parties have addressed them, each in a single brief, and we do 
so in a consolidated decision. 
In its exceptions, CSEA contests the conclusion of the 
hearing officer that the Association was entitled to not less than 
the access rights enjoyed by,;CSEA. It asserts that: 
"In determining whether the access enjoyed by the 
Association was reasonable, it is necessary to 
consider the totality of circumstances, including 
the access which, was requested, that which was 
granted, and that which was utilized by both the 
incumbent and challenger." 
Applying its own test, it argues that the Association was 
not denied reasonable access to a list of names and addresses 
because the lists that were provided to CSEA were not used for 
campaign purposes. Thus,' according to CSEA, the denial of the 
list did not place the Association at a disadvantage" vis' a. vis 
CSEA. In response, the Association contends that the utilization 
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of the list by CSEA is not an appropriate test; it is sufficient 
that the County afforded CSEA opportunities for campaign that 
were not available to the Association. According to the 
Association, the test proposed by CSEA would require this Board 
to inquire into the reasons why an incumbent organization 
chooses to utilize some, but not other campaign opportunities. 
Such an inquiry, the Association argues, would be impractical. 
The dispute regarding the denial of meeting space is similar 
to the dispute regarding address lists. CSEA argues that the 
Association was not denied reasonable access to meeting space 
because the record does not show that the meeting space that it 
used were utilized for campaign purposes. 
With respect to release time, CSEA argues that the demand 
made by the Association was so general that it did not put the 
County on notice as to what was requested of it.. The position of 
the hearing officer was that the request, although, not specific, 
was sufficient to put the County on notice tfiat it wanted release 
time for campaign purposes.' Moreover, the hearing officer con-
cluded that the response of the County to the Association on 
March 18 makes it clear that a more explicit request for time 
off would have also been denied.. The County indicated that it 
would deny the Association any request for an opportunity or 
privilege that was enjoyed by CSEA pursuant to the collective 
negotiated agreement and release time was such a privilege. 
Finally, CSEA argues that the hearing officer erred in his 
determination that the Association was denied appropriate 
opportunities to distribute campaign literature.. First, it 
argues that the request was too general to have imposed any 
obligation upon the County; second, it argues that,' notwithstanding 
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the denial of the request, the Association did distribute 
campaign literature on the County's premises; third it argues 
that the County had no knowledge that CSEA was distributing 
similar materials on the County's premises. On these three points 
the hearing officer found first, that the Association's demand was 
sufficient to put the County on notice that it wanted an 
opportunity to distribute campaign literature on the County's 
5 
premises;— second, that the surreptitious distribution of campaign 
materials by the Association was too limited to be reasonable 
when contrasted with the extensive distribution of campaign 
materials by CSEA; and third, that CSEA's distribution was suf-
ficiently extensive for the County to have had constructive, if 
not actual, knowledge of that distribution. 
In support of its exceptions, CSEA also argues that the 
hearing officer erred in His interpretation of the County's 
position on March 18. According to CSEA, the County did not 
categorically deny the request of the Association on that day; 
rather it withheld judgment on the request pending legal 
justification which the Association might furnish in support of 
its request. By not furnishing such, report, the Association, 
5_ The Association made no explicit request for release time or 
distribution privileges. After it raised the issue of access 
generally, the County invited it to a meeting.. At the meeting 
the County announced its position which, among other things, 
denied these privileges even before the Association asked for 
them. The discussion at the meeting was sufficient to put 
the County on notice that the Association wanted this 
campaign opportunity. 
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according to CSEA,waived its right to the access sought. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact 
of the hearing officer, which, in turn, were relied upon by the 
Director. We also find that the response of the County to the 
Association on March 18 did not constitute an invitation to 
resubmit its request for access with legal justifications. The 
County promised-the Association to consider new requests, but it 
rejected the requests that were already made. 
We apply the legal standard proposed by the hearing officer. 
During the period proximate to the time when a petition may be 
filed, a challenging employee organization is entitled to no less 
than the access afforded to the recognized or certified employee 
7 
organization. By denying such access to the Association, the 
County acted improperly. 
CSEA argues that even if the County's conduct were unreason-
able, the Association's time to file a sufficient showing of 
interest could not be extended. It relies upon §210.3 of our 
Rules which specifies the time when a showing of interest must be 
filed and contends that this Board may not depart from its Rules. 
6_ CSEA also argues in support of its exceptions that the 
Director is in error in proposing to hold an election because 
a negotiating unit has not been agreed upon. The record sup-
ports the Director's determination that there was agreement 
upon a negotiating unit. There is only a disagreement as to 
whether certain individual positions fit within the definition 
of the negotiating unit. That disagreement can be resolved by 
challenges to individual voters. 
]_• The hearing officer correctly noted a qualification not rele-
vant on the facts before us. Opportunities and benefits that 
• are extended to an incumbent employee organization need not be 
extended to another employee organization if they were designee 
to facilitate the exercise of the incumbent organization's 
responsibilities as the recognized or certified representative 
of the unit employees. 
otnJO 
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In dealing with this proposition, the hearing officer stated 
that CSEA has no standing to make this argument because the 
showing of interest rule is not designed to' protect an incumbent 
8 
employee organization. We agree. We also conclude that we may 
waive our Rules concerning the timeliness of the filing of a 
representation netition when this is an appropriate remedy in 
9 
ah improper practice case. Such is the case here because the 
improper practice interfered with the petitioner's opportunity 
to file a valid petition. 
10 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that: 
1. An election be held in the unit described by 
the Director; and 
8 See CSEA v. Newman, 66 App.Div.2d 38, 12 PERB 1[7001 (3rd Dept. 
1979T7reversed in part 46 NY2d 1005, 12 PERB 1f7005 (1979). 
9 cf.Marjac Poultry, Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); TBEW Local 233 
v. NLRB, 499 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir., 1974). 
10 The concern of all the parties is to ascertain whether an 
election is required and, if so, to hold it as soon as 
possible. With this in mind, they agreed-that the County 
----' would give to the Association the access opportunities and 
benefits directed by the hearing officer while this appeal 
was being processed. The parties have stipulated that the 
County did so and the Association has filed a new showing 
of interest. That showing of interest was found by the 
Director to be sufficient. Accordingly, parts of the remedy 
proposed by the hearing officer and the Director are academic 
and we do not include them in this Order. 
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2. The Cotinty cease and desist from denying to 
the Association access rights to which it is 
entitled by law. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 16, 1980 
\lMrMA,a*s 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
W^A 
David C. Randies , Member 
WJOO 
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-and-
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF THE NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, 
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This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Police 
Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc., 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation: Negotiating Unit (PBA) to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that the State 
of New York, Office of Employee Relations (State) violated C.S.L 
§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d). The circumstance underlying the 
charge is a wage reopener in a contract between the State and 
PBA. The reopener provides: 
"10.6 The State and the PBA agree that both parties 
will reopen negotiations regarding increases to base 
salary immediately upon execution of this Agreement 
to seek to amend this Agreement effective no earlier 
than April 1, 1980 regarding increases to base salary." 
(emphasis supplied) 
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Following PBA's demand to reopen negotiations, the parties 
met on March 6, 1980 to exchange positions. They met again, in 
formal negotiating sessions, on March 10 and March 11, 1980. At 
these meetings, PBA proposed to negotiate salary-related items 
including increments, geographical differentials, pension credits, 
holiday compensation, professional development incentive pay, 
overtime pay and standby pay. The State, based upon its reading 
of the contract, agreed to negotiate only the subject of base 
salary increases. With respect to base salaries, it proposed 
that there be no increase. 
In its charge, PBA asserts that the refusal of the State 
to negotiate the demands, other than base pay, is a repudiation 
of the contract. As such, according to PBA, it not only vio-
lated the duty to negotiate in good faith, but it also interfered 
with both individual and union rights. 
The hearing officer determined that the facts as alleged 
did not set forth violations of paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of 
1 
§ 209-a.l of the Taylor Law. She also determined that the sole 
question raised by the specification of the charge alleging a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) was whether the State was contractually 
obligated to negotiate the salary-related demands. She ruled 
that this issue involved a question of contract interpretation 
which is not within the jurisdiction of this Board. Accordingly, 
she granted a motion of the State to dismiss the charge. 
1 The precise words of the hearing officer are that PBA "does 
not even make an offer of proof of the deliberateness neces-
sary to sustain such violations." This wording occasioned an 
exception. PBA argues that it is not required to make an 
offer of proof. This exception is not directed to the merits 
of the decision and is of no consequence. 
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The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of PBA. In 
support of its exceptions, it argues that this Board has juris-
diction over the charge because the contractual obligation of 
the State to reopen negotiations is merely incidental to its 
statutory duty to negotiate in good faith. It further argues 
that, even if the State were justified in refusing to negotiate 
the salary-related demands, its conduct with respect to the 
demand for an increase in the base salary was a violation of its 
2 
duty to negotiate in good faith. 
We affirm the findings of..fact and.conclusions of law of the 
hearing 'Officer ''.r\ In "Levit'town,: 13 PERB': 1(30.14 :(..198.0)., we said: 
"Ordinarily,-:.'if 'a:.subject is dealt :with . in a'.collec-
tive.-agreement,; both'•parties , by'virtue of: that agree-
ment, are foreclosed from further negotiation on that 
• '•. ''subj:ec;t for:: the "life ;of. .the agreement." .•"v.' •. ,'' 
The Levittown .decisi6n.:.goes. on 'to hold'ithat a contrary intent 
will be honored if it is expressed in the parties' agreement. 
2_ PBA makes two other inconsequential exceptions. It states that 
the issue before the hearing officer was one involving scope 
of negotiation and, therefore, the hearing officer erred by 
refusing to process the matter under the special procedures 
of Rule 204.4. It also states that the hearing officer should 
not have granted the motion to dismiss the charge because the 
Rules of this Board do not specify any such procedure. 
Rule 204 provides for the expedited processing, within the 
discretion of this Board, of cases involving "a dispute as to 
the scope of negotiations under the Act." The charge herein 
does not raise such a question. Rather, it raises the ques-
tion whether, by reason of the terms of the parties' contract, 
some of the demands must be renegotiated during the life of 
that contract. Thus, it is not within the ambit of Rule 204.4 
which, in any event, is discretionary. 
Rule 204.7(h) contemplates the making of motions and 
rulings upon such motions by a hearing officer. A motion to 
dismiss a charge is one of the motions contemplated by Rule 
204.7(h), as indicated by Rule 204.7(1), which limits the 
time of filing of a motion to dismiss a stale charge. 
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Thus, during the life of an agreement, the obligation of the 
parties to negotiate a matter that is dealt with in the agreement 
derives from the agreement and not from the Taylor Law. 
The primary question raised by the charge is whether the 
State is under a contractual obligation to negotiate matters that 
would ordinarily be foreclosed from further negotiation during 
the life of the contract because they are covered by the contract. 
The contract covers salaries and salary related benefits, but it 
provides that the parties will "reopen negotiations regarding 
increases to base salary...." Based upon its interpretation of 
this clause, PBA is asserting a contractual right to negotiate 
increments, geographical differentials, pension credits, holiday 
compensation, professional development incentive pay, overtime 
pay and standby pay. It has charged that the State's refusal to 
negotiate these matters is a violation of its duty to negotiate 
in good faith. 
It is not for this Board to interpret the parties' contract 
to determine whether the parties intended base salary to include 
the various forms of compensation that are included in PBA's 
3 
demand. We are limited to considering whether the parties have 
negotiated in good faith as to matters that have been indisputably 
reopened for negotiations by the parties' agreement. 
As a secondary position, PBA's charge alleges that the 
State has not negotiated in good faith with respect to a matter 
3 Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law provides: "[T]he board 
shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee organization and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an agreement 
that would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or 
employee organization practice." 
mm 
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that, beyond dispute, is encompassed by the term, base salary. 
This aspect of the charge is within our jurisdiction. The facts 
as alleged, however, do not support PBA's charge in this regard. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 16, 1980 
HO^M-f \Kr _n^Hn 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
JLL 
David C. Randies, Member /  
